FINNIS ON NATURAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
John Finnis’ Natural Law and Natural Rights, first published in 1980, has sparked a debate that has lasted for nearly a quarter of a century. Finnis, a professor of jurisprudence at Oxford, has managed to revivify the discussion on natural law with what is being called a new natural law theory.
Natural Law and Natural Rights was intended to be more of an introduction to the theory than anything else. In fact, Finnis admits that ‘countless relevant matters’ are only discussed briefly or not discussed at all. As Finnis puts it, “My hope is that a re-presentation and development of many elements of the ‘classical’ or ‘mainstream’ theories of natural law, by way of an argument on the merits (as lawyers say), will be found useful by those who want to understand the history of the idea as well as by those interested in forming or reforming their own view of the merits.” 2. DEFINITION OF NATURAL LAW Broadly speaking, a natural law theory seeks to articulate a true understanding of human beings, and their moral worth. Natural law is concerned with the freedom of individuals to choose correctly and wrongly, as well as with the common good, which is enhanced by both individual initiative and enterprise within a community. Certain aspects of Finnis’ theory, in particular his theories of the basic human goods and the requirements of practical reasonableness have been important catalysts for the extensive discussion his theory has generated. Before entering further into this paper, it is imperative to clarify what Finnis in particular means by “natural law.” There are lots of different theories on natural law, but for the purpose of this paper I will use Finnis’ definition of a natural law theory. He is primarily concerned with natural law as a type of moral theory, not as a type of legal theory, although natural law moral theory has implications for legal theory down the line. As a moral theory, a natural law approach emphasizes that all human beings have the capacity to understand certain basic moral obligations. In broad outline, a natural law theory of morality says that the basic aspects of morality must be able to be understood by everyone, no matter what their race, creed, color or culture. In addition, the basic requirements of morality must also apply to everyone regardless of race, creed, color, or culture. Finnis’ definition of natural law entails the following requirements: First, he requires “a set of basic practical principles which indicate the basic forms of human flourishing as goods to be pursued and realized, and which are in one way or another used by everyone who considers what to do, however unsound his conclusions.” What this requirement basically means is that a natural law theory must have the intent of outlining things that are good, and that it should encourage people to realize that the goods are in fact good and that they should participate in them to the extent possible. The set of principles allows one to consider how to participate in the basic goods. Second, Finnis also requires “a set of basic methodological requirements of practical reasonableness (itself one of the basic forms of human flourishing) which distinguish sound from unsound practical thinking and which, when all brought to bear, provide the criteria for distinguishing between acts that (always or in particular circumstances) are reasonable-all-things-considered (and not merely relative-to-a-particular-purpose) and acts that are unreasonable-all-things-considered, i.e. between ways of acting that are morally right and morally wrong.” According to Finnis, what he calls practical reasonableness is the part of the natural law theory that helps one to distinguish right from wrong. In other words, the basic practical principles are what help one actualize the basic goods and practical reasonableness is what tells one which acts are valid participations in one or more of the basic goods. Third, taken together, the understanding of the basic goods and of the nature of practical reasonableness can enable one to formulate “a set of general moral standards.” Because they are “general moral standards,” they have to apply, in some sense, to everyone. The point of a natural law theory, in other words, is to help all people understand what they morally ought or ought not to do. However, this does not mean that a natural law theory is blind to the possibility of difference or disagreement, for three reasons. First, within the frame of the requirements of natural law there is room for flexibility in the ways of pursuing the basic human goods. Second, natural law theorists, including Finnis, are aware that people can reason in a morally unsound way. Third, Finnis expects there to be some level of disagreement about hard questions of morality. In other words, natural law theory is not a computer program in which moral questions are entered, definite answers are outputted, and people fall into line like numbers on a spreadsheet. Natural law theory offers a way of making decisions about how to go about living one’s life, given certain assumptions about what all human beings need to live their lives well. 3.0 FINNIS’ THEORY Basic human goods are what orient a natural law theory of morality. They are aspects of basic human flourishing. Finnis’ list of the basic human goods is as follows: Life When Finnis speaks of the basic human good of life, he refers to the universal drive for self-preservation. “The term ‘life’ here signifies every aspect of the vitality (vita, life) which puts a human being in good shape for self-determination.” Knowledge When Finnis discusses the good of knowledge, and he does so quite extensively, he speaks of knowledge for knowledge’s own sake and not as a means to some other end. When one recognizes knowledge as a good to be pursued, then he or she is acknowledging that it is good to find out the truth and that muddle and ignorance are bad. Finnis justifies the good of knowledge and the need to pursue it is self-evident. According to Finnis, “[the good of knowledge] cannot be demonstrated, but equally it needs no demonstration.” It is important to point out that when Finnis speaks of knowledge as self-evident, he is not referring to it as being innate. Finnis solidifies his point about the self-evidence of the proposition that truth is a good to be pursued by providing the example of someone questioning the good of knowledge. Play Finnis acknowledges play as one of the basic human goods. Play is the act of engaging in performances “which have no point beyond the performance itself, enjoyed for its own sake.” According to Finnis, play can be overlooked by some, but it is an irreducible element in human culture. “An element of play can enter into any human activity…”, but Finnis states that there are some activities that are pure play and that because of this; play is a value of its own. Aesthetic Experience The fourth basic human good is aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience is the realization and appreciation of beauty in many different things. One need not be the creator of the beauty, the beauty can be found in play, music, art, nature, or even in the pursuit of knowledge. Aesthetic experience can manifest itself in many forms of play as well as in nature, but it does not require one’s own action. Sociability (friendship) The fifth value is recognized as friendship. The good of friendship requires that one act for the sake of one’s friend’s well-being. According to Finnis, “community is a form of unifying relationship between human beings.” These unifying relationships are realized through four orders of community, the most important of which is the ‘unity of common action.’ This unity is developed by one committing to find his/her self-fulfillment by helping other members of his/her community find their self-fulfillment with participation in the basic goods. Practical Reasonableness Practical Reasonableness is “the basic good of being able to bring one’s own intelligence to bear effectively… on the problems of choosing one’s actions and life-style and shaping one’s own character.” The role of this good is quite complex because practical reasonableness is both a basic good and the way in which we ought to pursue the basic goods. Finnis saw the complexity of this good as warranting its own section, so is the case in Finnis’ book and so will be the case in this paper. For this reason, practical reasonableness will be discussed more in depth in a later section. Religion The basic good which Finnis refers to as religion is in regards to the concern for the order of the cosmos. Finnis is not referring to any particular religion at this point. Nor is he saying that one can grasp the truths of particular religions only with reason. Finnis would say that one needs ‘faith,’ for example, not just reason, to grasp the truths of Roman Catholicism. What can be said about the basic goods? Goods are for all people and they can be realized by all people who take into consideration what is right and wrong to do. One can enter this consideration regardless of culture. Finnis contends that the contents of his list of basic human values are self-evident. Finnis supports this thought by alluding to Aquinas’ theory that basic human goods are indemonstrabilia or not capable of being demonstrated. Thus the good of the pursuit of knowledge cannot be demonstrated but by the same token it does not require any demonstration. All of the seven basic human goods are equally fundamental. Each of the goods is equally self-evident. Also, according to Finnis, “none can be analytically reduced to being merely an aspect of the other, or to being merely instrumental in the pursuit of any of the others.” It is the nature of each of the seven basic goods to be capable of being referred to as the most important at different points in time. “But one’s reason for choosing are reasons that properly relate to one’s temperament, upbringing, capacities, and opportunities, not to differences of rank of intrinsic value between the basic goods.” It is necessary at this point, after the extensive list of basic human goods, that I emphasize Finnis’ claim that his identification of the contents of this list does not depend on any moral judgment. In other words, Finnis claims that recognition of these basic goods does not yet generate any moral rules. What generates a moral rule are the requirements of practical reasonableness applied to the basic goods, guiding us with respect to how we should participate in the basic human goods. 4.0 REQUIREMENTS OF PRACTICAL REASONABLENESS The requirements of practical reasonableness express the method of working out Finnis’ natural law. Those requirements “concern fullness of well-being (in the measure in which any one person can enjoy such fullness of well-being in the circumstances of his lifetime).” In other words, practical reasonableness deals with what morally ought or ought not to be done in the pursuit of the other basic human goods. The first requirement of practical reasonableness is to formulate a rational plan of life, which requires looking at the activities of a life holistically in order not to favor one basic good over another. This requirement operates as a harmonizing of commitments. Finnis acknowledges that a rational life plan will focus on some goods more than others, but he requires that we not use this as a reason to deny any of the basic goods. Finnis here is not implying that we must have the perfect life with the perfect balance to participate in all the basic human goods. No, Finnis does not require each of us to be the ideal college applicant with all the right extracurricular activities. Finnis’ requirements of practical reasonableness instead call for one to remain open to the value of all the basic goods, no matter what the focus of one’s rational plan for life. According to Finnis’ second requirement, “there must be no leaving out of account, or arbitrary discounting or exaggeration, of any of the basic human goods.” Finnis acknowledges that any coherent plan of life will involve some partiality to a basic good, but there are certain requirements that determine whether that partiality is either rational or irrational. What makes the commitment to one good over another rational is if the commitment is reached based on “one’s capacities, circumstances, and even of one’s tastes.” However, such a commitment would be unreasonable if it is either based on some devaluation of a basic human good or if too much value is given to ‘instrumental goods’ such as wealth, opportunity, reputation, or pleasure. The third requirement follows along the lines of the Golden Rule: “Do to others what you would have them do to you.” The essence of this requirement is that one should not participate in the denial that another’s rational life is truly good. This requirement assumes that self-preference will lead you not to be completely concerned with another’s survival, knowledge, creativity, or pursuit of any of the other basic goods, but one must not discount another’s pursuits as not truly good. Finnis puts the fourth and fifth requirements of practical reasonableness together because they both relate to each other and to the requirement of a coherent plan for life. The fourth requirement is that of detachment. In Finnis’ theory, one must have a certain detachment from his projects that he takes on in his life. This detachment is necessary in order to remain “sufficiently open to all the basic forms of good.” The fifth requirement is actually a call not to drop one’s commitments lightly. Finnis argues that if one was to adopt an attitude of apathy toward his commitment, then he would not really be participating in the basic human goods. The sixth requirement essentially states that one should bring about good in the world. It is part of this requirement that one is to be efficient in his actions in trying to carry out the basic goods. The sixth requirement ties in deeply with some of the other requirements of practical reason. “The first, second, and third requirements require that in seeking to maximize the satisfaction of preference one should discount the preferences of, for example, sadists (who follow the impulses of the moment, and/or do not respect the value of life, and/or do not universalize their principles of action with impartiality).” Finnis says that, the first, third, and as you will see very shortly, the seventh and eight requirements insist that any projects involving “killings, frauds, manipulation of personality, etc” must be excluded from a cost benefit analysis. Finnis claims that because of these requirements utilitarianism and consequentionalism are both irrational; in his view, the “methodological injunction to maximize good is irrational.” Finnis claims this irrationality because no common denominator of ‘basic human end’ can be determined. “Only an inhumane fanatic thinks that man is made to flourish in only one way or for only one purpose.” In other words, there are too many combinations of basic goods to formulate a common denominator of a goal present in all humans. Because utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialism require such a common denominator as a fundamental basis of their approaches to moral questions, they are ultimately untenable. The seventh requirement is one that has several formulations which involve respect for every basic value in every act. The first formulation of this requirement is that one should not carry out an act which is acting directly against one or more of the basic goods. Finnis justifies this requirement by stating that, “Once we have excluded consequentionalist reasoning, with its humanly understandable but in truth naively arbitrary limitation of focus to the purported calculus ‘one life versus many’, the seventh requirement is self-evident.” What Finnis is saying is that once one gets rid of the idea of a common denominator being present, for instance that any situation in which one life sacrificed could save many, then one ought not come to the decision that the preservation of life is greater than the good of not killing someone without a reasonably fair cause. However, it must not go unsaid that to choose an act that indirectly damages a basic good as a result of an act that directly or indirectly enhances some basic good is not morally unacceptable to Finnis The eighth requirement of practical reason serves as the basis for “our concrete moral responsibilities, obligations, and duties.” This requirement is that of favoring the common good of one’s communities. Throughout Finnis’s book, he understands the common good as a “set of conditions which enable the members of a community to attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in a community” In other words, to participate in the common good is to realize what would enhance the participation in goods of both your neighbor and of yourself. The final requirement is that which “one should not do what one judges or thinks or ‘feels’-all-in-all should not be done.” Therefore, practical reasonableness requires that one act in accordance with one’s conscience. For Finnis, the end product of the preceding nine requirements of practical reasonableness is morality. “Suffice it to say here that each of the requirements can be thought of as a mode of moral judgments or responsibility.” “Thus, speaking very summarily, we could say that the requirements to which we now turn express the ‘natural law method’ of working out the (moral) ‘natural law’ from the first (pre-moral) ‘principles of natural law’.” Thus Finnis’ practical reasonableness is concerned with what morally ought or ought not to be done. Do we need a separate theory of human nature that supports natural law theory? Yes and no. Finnis states that “the criterion of conformity with our contrariety to human nature is reasonableness.” So, while Finnis notes the need for a philosophy of nature, he insists that reasonableness controls how one participates in human nature. On the one hand, Finnis thinks it would be a good idea to have a full-blown theory of human nature. On the other however, he doesn’t believe anything in natural law theory turns on it. What does the work in Finnis’ theory is his theory of practical reasonableness.
Natural Law and Natural Rights was intended to be more of an introduction to the theory than anything else. In fact, Finnis admits that ‘countless relevant matters’ are only discussed briefly or not discussed at all. As Finnis puts it, “My hope is that a re-presentation and development of many elements of the ‘classical’ or ‘mainstream’ theories of natural law, by way of an argument on the merits (as lawyers say), will be found useful by those who want to understand the history of the idea as well as by those interested in forming or reforming their own view of the merits.” 2. DEFINITION OF NATURAL LAW Broadly speaking, a natural law theory seeks to articulate a true understanding of human beings, and their moral worth. Natural law is concerned with the freedom of individuals to choose correctly and wrongly, as well as with the common good, which is enhanced by both individual initiative and enterprise within a community. Certain aspects of Finnis’ theory, in particular his theories of the basic human goods and the requirements of practical reasonableness have been important catalysts for the extensive discussion his theory has generated. Before entering further into this paper, it is imperative to clarify what Finnis in particular means by “natural law.” There are lots of different theories on natural law, but for the purpose of this paper I will use Finnis’ definition of a natural law theory. He is primarily concerned with natural law as a type of moral theory, not as a type of legal theory, although natural law moral theory has implications for legal theory down the line. As a moral theory, a natural law approach emphasizes that all human beings have the capacity to understand certain basic moral obligations. In broad outline, a natural law theory of morality says that the basic aspects of morality must be able to be understood by everyone, no matter what their race, creed, color or culture. In addition, the basic requirements of morality must also apply to everyone regardless of race, creed, color, or culture. Finnis’ definition of natural law entails the following requirements: First, he requires “a set of basic practical principles which indicate the basic forms of human flourishing as goods to be pursued and realized, and which are in one way or another used by everyone who considers what to do, however unsound his conclusions.” What this requirement basically means is that a natural law theory must have the intent of outlining things that are good, and that it should encourage people to realize that the goods are in fact good and that they should participate in them to the extent possible. The set of principles allows one to consider how to participate in the basic goods. Second, Finnis also requires “a set of basic methodological requirements of practical reasonableness (itself one of the basic forms of human flourishing) which distinguish sound from unsound practical thinking and which, when all brought to bear, provide the criteria for distinguishing between acts that (always or in particular circumstances) are reasonable-all-things-considered (and not merely relative-to-a-particular-purpose) and acts that are unreasonable-all-things-considered, i.e. between ways of acting that are morally right and morally wrong.” According to Finnis, what he calls practical reasonableness is the part of the natural law theory that helps one to distinguish right from wrong. In other words, the basic practical principles are what help one actualize the basic goods and practical reasonableness is what tells one which acts are valid participations in one or more of the basic goods. Third, taken together, the understanding of the basic goods and of the nature of practical reasonableness can enable one to formulate “a set of general moral standards.” Because they are “general moral standards,” they have to apply, in some sense, to everyone. The point of a natural law theory, in other words, is to help all people understand what they morally ought or ought not to do. However, this does not mean that a natural law theory is blind to the possibility of difference or disagreement, for three reasons. First, within the frame of the requirements of natural law there is room for flexibility in the ways of pursuing the basic human goods. Second, natural law theorists, including Finnis, are aware that people can reason in a morally unsound way. Third, Finnis expects there to be some level of disagreement about hard questions of morality. In other words, natural law theory is not a computer program in which moral questions are entered, definite answers are outputted, and people fall into line like numbers on a spreadsheet. Natural law theory offers a way of making decisions about how to go about living one’s life, given certain assumptions about what all human beings need to live their lives well. 3.0 FINNIS’ THEORY Basic human goods are what orient a natural law theory of morality. They are aspects of basic human flourishing. Finnis’ list of the basic human goods is as follows: Life When Finnis speaks of the basic human good of life, he refers to the universal drive for self-preservation. “The term ‘life’ here signifies every aspect of the vitality (vita, life) which puts a human being in good shape for self-determination.” Knowledge When Finnis discusses the good of knowledge, and he does so quite extensively, he speaks of knowledge for knowledge’s own sake and not as a means to some other end. When one recognizes knowledge as a good to be pursued, then he or she is acknowledging that it is good to find out the truth and that muddle and ignorance are bad. Finnis justifies the good of knowledge and the need to pursue it is self-evident. According to Finnis, “[the good of knowledge] cannot be demonstrated, but equally it needs no demonstration.” It is important to point out that when Finnis speaks of knowledge as self-evident, he is not referring to it as being innate. Finnis solidifies his point about the self-evidence of the proposition that truth is a good to be pursued by providing the example of someone questioning the good of knowledge. Play Finnis acknowledges play as one of the basic human goods. Play is the act of engaging in performances “which have no point beyond the performance itself, enjoyed for its own sake.” According to Finnis, play can be overlooked by some, but it is an irreducible element in human culture. “An element of play can enter into any human activity…”, but Finnis states that there are some activities that are pure play and that because of this; play is a value of its own. Aesthetic Experience The fourth basic human good is aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience is the realization and appreciation of beauty in many different things. One need not be the creator of the beauty, the beauty can be found in play, music, art, nature, or even in the pursuit of knowledge. Aesthetic experience can manifest itself in many forms of play as well as in nature, but it does not require one’s own action. Sociability (friendship) The fifth value is recognized as friendship. The good of friendship requires that one act for the sake of one’s friend’s well-being. According to Finnis, “community is a form of unifying relationship between human beings.” These unifying relationships are realized through four orders of community, the most important of which is the ‘unity of common action.’ This unity is developed by one committing to find his/her self-fulfillment by helping other members of his/her community find their self-fulfillment with participation in the basic goods. Practical Reasonableness Practical Reasonableness is “the basic good of being able to bring one’s own intelligence to bear effectively… on the problems of choosing one’s actions and life-style and shaping one’s own character.” The role of this good is quite complex because practical reasonableness is both a basic good and the way in which we ought to pursue the basic goods. Finnis saw the complexity of this good as warranting its own section, so is the case in Finnis’ book and so will be the case in this paper. For this reason, practical reasonableness will be discussed more in depth in a later section. Religion The basic good which Finnis refers to as religion is in regards to the concern for the order of the cosmos. Finnis is not referring to any particular religion at this point. Nor is he saying that one can grasp the truths of particular religions only with reason. Finnis would say that one needs ‘faith,’ for example, not just reason, to grasp the truths of Roman Catholicism. What can be said about the basic goods? Goods are for all people and they can be realized by all people who take into consideration what is right and wrong to do. One can enter this consideration regardless of culture. Finnis contends that the contents of his list of basic human values are self-evident. Finnis supports this thought by alluding to Aquinas’ theory that basic human goods are indemonstrabilia or not capable of being demonstrated. Thus the good of the pursuit of knowledge cannot be demonstrated but by the same token it does not require any demonstration. All of the seven basic human goods are equally fundamental. Each of the goods is equally self-evident. Also, according to Finnis, “none can be analytically reduced to being merely an aspect of the other, or to being merely instrumental in the pursuit of any of the others.” It is the nature of each of the seven basic goods to be capable of being referred to as the most important at different points in time. “But one’s reason for choosing are reasons that properly relate to one’s temperament, upbringing, capacities, and opportunities, not to differences of rank of intrinsic value between the basic goods.” It is necessary at this point, after the extensive list of basic human goods, that I emphasize Finnis’ claim that his identification of the contents of this list does not depend on any moral judgment. In other words, Finnis claims that recognition of these basic goods does not yet generate any moral rules. What generates a moral rule are the requirements of practical reasonableness applied to the basic goods, guiding us with respect to how we should participate in the basic human goods. 4.0 REQUIREMENTS OF PRACTICAL REASONABLENESS The requirements of practical reasonableness express the method of working out Finnis’ natural law. Those requirements “concern fullness of well-being (in the measure in which any one person can enjoy such fullness of well-being in the circumstances of his lifetime).” In other words, practical reasonableness deals with what morally ought or ought not to be done in the pursuit of the other basic human goods. The first requirement of practical reasonableness is to formulate a rational plan of life, which requires looking at the activities of a life holistically in order not to favor one basic good over another. This requirement operates as a harmonizing of commitments. Finnis acknowledges that a rational life plan will focus on some goods more than others, but he requires that we not use this as a reason to deny any of the basic goods. Finnis here is not implying that we must have the perfect life with the perfect balance to participate in all the basic human goods. No, Finnis does not require each of us to be the ideal college applicant with all the right extracurricular activities. Finnis’ requirements of practical reasonableness instead call for one to remain open to the value of all the basic goods, no matter what the focus of one’s rational plan for life. According to Finnis’ second requirement, “there must be no leaving out of account, or arbitrary discounting or exaggeration, of any of the basic human goods.” Finnis acknowledges that any coherent plan of life will involve some partiality to a basic good, but there are certain requirements that determine whether that partiality is either rational or irrational. What makes the commitment to one good over another rational is if the commitment is reached based on “one’s capacities, circumstances, and even of one’s tastes.” However, such a commitment would be unreasonable if it is either based on some devaluation of a basic human good or if too much value is given to ‘instrumental goods’ such as wealth, opportunity, reputation, or pleasure. The third requirement follows along the lines of the Golden Rule: “Do to others what you would have them do to you.” The essence of this requirement is that one should not participate in the denial that another’s rational life is truly good. This requirement assumes that self-preference will lead you not to be completely concerned with another’s survival, knowledge, creativity, or pursuit of any of the other basic goods, but one must not discount another’s pursuits as not truly good. Finnis puts the fourth and fifth requirements of practical reasonableness together because they both relate to each other and to the requirement of a coherent plan for life. The fourth requirement is that of detachment. In Finnis’ theory, one must have a certain detachment from his projects that he takes on in his life. This detachment is necessary in order to remain “sufficiently open to all the basic forms of good.” The fifth requirement is actually a call not to drop one’s commitments lightly. Finnis argues that if one was to adopt an attitude of apathy toward his commitment, then he would not really be participating in the basic human goods. The sixth requirement essentially states that one should bring about good in the world. It is part of this requirement that one is to be efficient in his actions in trying to carry out the basic goods. The sixth requirement ties in deeply with some of the other requirements of practical reason. “The first, second, and third requirements require that in seeking to maximize the satisfaction of preference one should discount the preferences of, for example, sadists (who follow the impulses of the moment, and/or do not respect the value of life, and/or do not universalize their principles of action with impartiality).” Finnis says that, the first, third, and as you will see very shortly, the seventh and eight requirements insist that any projects involving “killings, frauds, manipulation of personality, etc” must be excluded from a cost benefit analysis. Finnis claims that because of these requirements utilitarianism and consequentionalism are both irrational; in his view, the “methodological injunction to maximize good is irrational.” Finnis claims this irrationality because no common denominator of ‘basic human end’ can be determined. “Only an inhumane fanatic thinks that man is made to flourish in only one way or for only one purpose.” In other words, there are too many combinations of basic goods to formulate a common denominator of a goal present in all humans. Because utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialism require such a common denominator as a fundamental basis of their approaches to moral questions, they are ultimately untenable. The seventh requirement is one that has several formulations which involve respect for every basic value in every act. The first formulation of this requirement is that one should not carry out an act which is acting directly against one or more of the basic goods. Finnis justifies this requirement by stating that, “Once we have excluded consequentionalist reasoning, with its humanly understandable but in truth naively arbitrary limitation of focus to the purported calculus ‘one life versus many’, the seventh requirement is self-evident.” What Finnis is saying is that once one gets rid of the idea of a common denominator being present, for instance that any situation in which one life sacrificed could save many, then one ought not come to the decision that the preservation of life is greater than the good of not killing someone without a reasonably fair cause. However, it must not go unsaid that to choose an act that indirectly damages a basic good as a result of an act that directly or indirectly enhances some basic good is not morally unacceptable to Finnis The eighth requirement of practical reason serves as the basis for “our concrete moral responsibilities, obligations, and duties.” This requirement is that of favoring the common good of one’s communities. Throughout Finnis’s book, he understands the common good as a “set of conditions which enable the members of a community to attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in a community” In other words, to participate in the common good is to realize what would enhance the participation in goods of both your neighbor and of yourself. The final requirement is that which “one should not do what one judges or thinks or ‘feels’-all-in-all should not be done.” Therefore, practical reasonableness requires that one act in accordance with one’s conscience. For Finnis, the end product of the preceding nine requirements of practical reasonableness is morality. “Suffice it to say here that each of the requirements can be thought of as a mode of moral judgments or responsibility.” “Thus, speaking very summarily, we could say that the requirements to which we now turn express the ‘natural law method’ of working out the (moral) ‘natural law’ from the first (pre-moral) ‘principles of natural law’.” Thus Finnis’ practical reasonableness is concerned with what morally ought or ought not to be done. Do we need a separate theory of human nature that supports natural law theory? Yes and no. Finnis states that “the criterion of conformity with our contrariety to human nature is reasonableness.” So, while Finnis notes the need for a philosophy of nature, he insists that reasonableness controls how one participates in human nature. On the one hand, Finnis thinks it would be a good idea to have a full-blown theory of human nature. On the other however, he doesn’t believe anything in natural law theory turns on it. What does the work in Finnis’ theory is his theory of practical reasonableness.
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